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Abstract
This study revisits the trade and welfare effects of 19th century bilateralism exploiting 
the latest developments in structural gravity models, including the consideration 
of domestic trade. Using bilateral trade data between 1855 and 1875, I show that 
the Cobden-Chevalier network, i.e. a system of bilateral trade agreements including the 
Most Favored Nation clause, had large, positive and significant effects on members’ 
trade. These, however, were heterogeneous at the treaty-level. I then calculate its 
general equilibrium effects on total trade and welfare. They are considerable, while 
trade diversion effects are negligible. These results reshape the understanding of the 
Cobden-Chevalier network, helping in further rationalizing the “free trade epidemic” of 
the 1860s and 1870s.
Keywords: international trade, trade agreements, MFN, Cobden-Chevalier, structural 
gravity models.
JEL classification: F13, F14, F15, N30, N70.
Resumen
Este estudio revisa los efectos sobre el comercio y el bienestar del bilateralismo del siglo XIX 
aprovechando los últimos avances en los modelos de gravedad estructural, incluida 
la consideración del comercio doméstico. Utilizando datos de comercio bilateral entre 
1855 y 1875, muestro que la red Cobden-Chevalier, es decir, un sistema de acuerdos 
comerciales bilaterales que también incluye la cláusula de la nación más favorecida, 
tuvo efectos importantes, positivos y significativos en el comercio entre sus miembros. 
Sin embargo, estos eran heterogéneos en cuanto a tratados. A continuación, calculo 
sus efectos de equilibrio general sobre el comercio total y el bienestar. Estos son 
considerables, mientras que los efectos de desviación del comercio son limitados. 
Los resultados modifican la comprensión de la red Cobden-Chevalier, lo que ayuda a 
racionalizar aún más la «epidemia del libre comercio» de las décadas de 1860 y 1870.
Palabras clave: comercio internacional, acuerdos comerciales, NMF, Cobden-Chevalier, 
modelos de gravedad estructural.
Códigos JEL: F13, F14, F15, N30, N70.
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1. Introduction 
Did the “free trade epidemic” (Lazer, 1999) of the 1860s and the 1870s, based on 
bilateral trade agreements with Most Favored Nation clauses, increase trade? If so, what 
effects it had on the welfare of nations? 
Contemporary accounts described these two decades as the “golden age” of trade 
liberalization via trade agreements, whose proliferation was actively contributing to 
reduce tariffs, that constituted a relevant part of the impediments that weighted on 
international trade at the time (Stringher, 1889). Indeed, in 1860, Great Britain and 
France signed a landmark trade treaty, substantially reducing – even if not entirely 
eliminating – bilateral tariffs between the two countries. This agreement, named after 
the two negotiators, Richard Cobden and Michel Chevalier, also included the Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) clause, meaning that the tariff concessions agreed in the treaty 
would be automatically applied to all other trade partners with whom the countries had 
also stipulated a trade agreement with an MFN clause. Since the Cobden-Chevalier 
treaty, bilateral trade agreements proliferated among European countries (signing more 
than 50 bilateral MFN treaties in approximately 15 years, Lampe, 2009), as well as 
beyond the continent’s borders (Tena-Junguito et al., 2013), thus creating a genuine 
trade network, i.e. the Cobden-Chevalier network.1 As summarized by Lampe (Lampe, 
2009, p. 1018), the Cobden-Chevalier network was a conglomerate of bilateral treaties 
but with a “multilateral quality”. 
While broad-ranging accounts of 19th century trade policy praise the Cobden-Chevalier 
network as a useful instrument for economic integration (Bairoch, 1989; Nye, 1991a; 
Nye, 1991b; Irwin, 1993a and 1993b; O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999), a series of 
quantitative assessments based on gravity models (with international trade only) 
questioned its real effectiveness in promoting trade. Accominotti and Flandreau (2008) 
argue that the Cobden-Chevalier trade effects is insignificant, downplaying its trade 
liberalization role. Lampe (2009) confirms Accominotti and Flandreau (2008) results on 
aggregate bilateral trade. However, exploiting sector-level data, he finds positive trade 
effects for some sectors. These findings would be in line with the focus of trade 
                                                          
1 An in-depth discussion of the causes behind the spread of trade agreements during the 1860s and 1870s 
are beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on the trade and welfare consequences. Interested 
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readers may refer to Pahre (2007) and Lampe (2011). 
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negotiators on achieving tariff concessions for specific products, and not overall trade 
liberalization. 
However, despite negotiations of trade treaties were inevitably about the nitty-gritty of 
tariffs, i.e. detailed discussions on the size of tariff cuts and the products to be included 
(or not) in the tariff reduction/exemption list, the agreements comprised, at least in 
certain cases, “a large set of important products” (Becuwe et al., 2018) corresponding 
to substantial shares of pre-agreement bilateral trade. In light of the above, one would 
expect the Cobden-Chevalier network to have effects on aggregate bilateral trade.   
Making use of a structural gravity model, this paper revisits the effects of the Cobden-
Chevalier network on trade and welfare. I apply a poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood 
(PPML, Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), with theory-consistent fixed effects, and 
including domestic trade.  
My contribution to the literature is threefold. First, I include domestic trade in a 
structural gravity model to estimate the effects of bilateralism in the 19th century. The 
inclusion of domestic trade is suggested by theory and crucial to avoid obtaining 
downward-biased estimations, by capturing the trade agreement-driven choice of 
selling internationally rather than domestically.2 Second, I perform treaty-level 
estimates, i.e. I allow for heterogeneous effects across trade agreements. Third, I 
quantify the general equilibrium effects on total trade and welfare of the Cobden-
Chevalier network at the country level. 
First, I find that, on average, the Cobden-Chevalier network had large, positive, and 
significant effects on bilateral trade among members. Second, I document a substantial 
degree of heterogeneity of trade effects across treaties. Third, I show, using a general 
equilibrium framework, that the Cobden-Chevalier network had, on average, a positive 
impact on the welfare of nations. The general equilibrium calculations also indicate that 
                                                          
2 Yotov et al. (2016) and Yotov (2021) describe in details all the advantages of considering domestic trade 
in structural gravity models. Despite its importance, only few papers explicitly take domestic flows into 
account. For the first globalization period, prominent examples are Jacks et al. (2010) and Jacks et al. 
(2011), studying the evolution and determinants of trade and trade costs. Another example is Karlsson 
and Hedberg (2021). However, Karlsson and Hedberg (2021) focus on the effect of wars on trade, and 
estimate domestic trade by using a handful of different sources. In some cases, however, these databases, 
have very accurate information on trade and openness, but GDP can only be estimated indirectly (e.g. 
Federico-Tena World Trade Historical Database, see Federico and Tena-Junguito, 2019), others have real 
GDP data that needs to be reflated using price indices, with the risk of introducing noise in the data (e.g. 
Maddison Project Database, see Bolt et al., 2018). 
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the trade diversion effects of the Cobden-Chevalier network were very limited. Taken 
together, these results reshape the understanding of the Cobden-Chevalier network 
trade and welfare effects. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provid s more details  
the historical context and on the literatur , Section 3 presents the theory  and escrib s
the empirical strategy and data. Section 4 discusses the (partial equilibrium) results. 
Section 5 is dedicated to the general equilibrium analysis. Section 6 draws the 
conclusions. 
2. Historical context and literature review 
The 1860s and 1870s are r garded as the years where trade liberalization policies spread 
in Europe (and beyond) by the mean of bilateral trade agreements (see Figure 1). To this 
extent, the 1860 trade treaty between Great Britain and France – the so-called Cobden-
Chevalier treaty, after the names of the trade negotiators –  is often regarded as the 
inception of the bilateral agreement-based network that developed thereafter. Since 
then, more than 50 agreements were signed in less than two decades (Lampe, 2009). 
This corresponded with a period of sustained increase in world trade (see Figure 2, and 
Federico and Tena-Junguito, 2019).  
Figure 1: Post-Cobden-Chevalier trade agreements, 1860-1875. 
 
Note: Sample average : average number of trade agreements in force per country. European 
powers : average number of trade agreements in force in Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, 
Austria-Hungary, Italy. 
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Figure 2: World trade, 1855-1875. 
 
Note: Logarithm of world imports, expressed in million 1913 US$. 
Source : Author’s elaboration on the World Trade Historical Database (Federico and Tena-
Junguito, 2019). 
Traditional accounts of t  first wave of lobaliza ion (Bairoch, 1989; Nye, 1991a; Nye, 
1991b; Irwin, 1993a and 1993b; O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999) regard the Cobden-
Chevalier treaty, and the subsequent network of bilateral trade agreements 
incorporating MFN clauses, as a catalyst for trade liberalization, by the mean of reducing 
tariff barriers. The role of the network in decreasing tariffs has been recently confirmed 
by Tena-Junguito et al. (2013), with a detailed analysis of tariff levels on manufacturing 
products. These findings are in line with Jacks et al. (2010) and Jacks et al. (2011) that, 
using a longer time period, point towards a decisive role of trade costs decline (of which 
tariffs would constitute a relevant part) in promoting trade integration during the first 
wave of globalization. 
However, the cliometric efforts quantifying the trade effects of the Cobden-Chevalier 
trade network casted some doubts on its effectiveness. Accominotti and Flandreau 
(2008) use a gravity model (with international trade only) and find that the Cobden-
Chevalier variable inserted in the model (a dummy equal to one if a MFN treaty is in 
force between the exporter and the importer) displays a not statistically significant 
coefficient. Consequently, they argue that the Cobden-Chevalier trade network did not 
promote bilateral trade, questioning its trade integration role.3 Lampe (2009) suggests 
that the Cobden-Chevalier trade network did not affect aggregate bilateral trade, but 
indicates sector-level bilateral trade effects instead, mostly for manufacturing. These 
                                                          
3 While focusing on the gold standard during the 1870-1913 period, Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2003) 
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results would reflect the negotiators interest in reducing specific, product-level, tariffs 
rat er than overall protection. 
Trade negotiations are often a matter of product-specific negotiations concerning the 
corresponding changes to tariff barriers to be included in the agreement. Two 
considerations are relevant here. First, product-level negotiations are also a 
characteristic of 20th and 21st century trade agre ments, which have been found to have 
positive effects on aggregate bilateral trade (Dai et al., 2014; Baier et al., 2019). Second, 
and perhaps more importantly, at least in some cases, the trade agreements of the 
Cobden-Chevalier network included tariff cuts for a large list of important products, 
corresponding to substantial shares of pre-agreement bilateral trade.4 For example, 
tariff exemptions, tariff cuts, MFN or other preferential treatments agreed in the 
treaties between Italy and France (1863), and Italy and Austria-Hungary (1867) covered 
more than two thirds (≈70%) of Italian bilateral export value (to France and to Austria-
Hungary, respectively). The preferential treatments conceded in the 1860 Anglo-French 
Treaty of Commerce itself comprised “a large set of important products” (Becuwe et al., 
2018). Were these number to be true on a wider scale, one would expect the Cobden-
Chevalier network to have effects on aggregate bilateral trade.   
 
                                                          
4 In the text I report some (anecdotal) evidence based on publicly available bilateral product-level trade 
data (Federico et al., 2012) and tariff cuts included in some treaties of the period. While I would ideally 
rely on properly structured database including information on trade flows and tariff changes allowing a 
cross-country comparison, the collection of such information is cumbersome for the period under 
analysis. Bilateral trade flow data has been digitalized for a number of countries in recent years (for an 
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3. Theory, empirical strategy and data 
3.1. Theory 
My partial equilibrium empirical framework is based on a structural gravity model,5 as 
formulated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Head and Mayer (2014) and Yotov et 
al. (2016). As shown by Arkolakis et al. (2012), this well-known general theoretical 
f amework embodies a wide set of distinct models, and can be summariz d by the
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H re, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 id ntifies ilate al trade flows from exporter i  to importer j at time t. When
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denot s domestic trade flows, and when 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes internation l 
trade flows. Exporter’s i production value is 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and importer’s j expenditure is 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. The 
variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 denotes the value of world output. The element 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 captures bilateral trade 
costs. The terms Ω𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and Π𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the outward and inward multilateral resistances 
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). They correspond to measures of exporter’s i access 
to export markets, and competition in the importer’s j domestic market (Fally, 2015). 𝜎𝜎 
is interpretable as a trade elasticity. Therefore, as explained in detail in Yotov et al. 
(2016), equation (1) shows the relation between bilateral trade flows on one side and 
economic size and trade costs on the other. 
The explicit consideration of domestic trade is one of the latest advances in structural 
gravity models (Yotov, 2012; Dai et al., 2014; Yotov et al., 2016). In general, the inclusion 
of domestic trade is very important for two main reasons. First, it is theory-consistent, 
and, second, it allows to capture the domestic-to-international “diversion” effect of 
bilateral trade policy, driven by changes in the relative costs of selling in the domestic 
rather than in the other members’ (international) markets. In other words, with 
                                                          
5 The general equilibrium framework is explained in section 5. 
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international flows only, the trade agreement coefficient is likely to be biased 
downwards. The inclusion of domestic flows allows to compare the relative change of 
domestic to international flows. 
3.2. Empirical strategy  
I implement the theoretical approach empirically by using the Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood (PPML) estimation technique (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), computing 
standard errors by clustering on exporter, importer, and time (Egger and Tarlea, 2015). 
This methodology allows to properly account for the presence of “zeros” and 
heteroscedasticity, two relevant features of bilateral trade data. 
In the first specification, I follow the existing literature, and use international trade only: 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = exp(𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (4) 
In this case, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are exports from country i (the exporter) to country j (the importer) at 
time t. The variable 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 identifies trade agreements, and corresponds to a dummy 
variable equals to one when the exporter i and the importer j have a trade agreement 
in force at time t, and zero otherwise. The variables 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are exporter-time and 
importer-time dummies, and represent the theory-consistent way to incorporate the 
multilateral resistance terms described in equation (2) and (3). The variable 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 identifies 
exporter-importer dummies. In this way, in line with the literature, I allow for 
asymmetric trade costs and trade imbalances (Waugh, 2010), and address possible trade 
policy endogeneity, as in the approach of Baier and Bergstrand (2007).6 The error term 
is 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
As an intermediate step, in the second specification, I consider both international and 
domestic trade: 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = exp(𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (5) 
Here, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 includes both domestic (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and international trade flows (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , ∀ i≠j). The 
inclusion of domestic trade is important for having theory-consistent estimates and to 
capture trade diversion from domestic to international. 
                                                          
6 These batteries of dummy variables absorb standard gravity variables with exporter-time, importer-time 
and country-pair variation, such as GDP, GDP per capita, population, distance, contiguity, common 
language, colonial relationship, etc.., preventing their estimation. 
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In the preferred specification, I implement Bergstrand et al. (2015) approach to 
disentangle broader economic integration processes from the bilateral trade agreement 
effects, by including a “globalization trend”:    
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = exp(𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼_𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (6) 
The new variable in equation (6), 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼_𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, is the result of the interaction of a 
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better capture the “trade agreement” effects, by disentangling the effect of any other 
factor affecting differently international and domestic trade. For example, using this 
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Finally, I exploit the advances in econometrics and in data availability to estimate treaty-
level trade effects, i.e. the effect of each trade agreements included in the database. 
Formally, I estimate the following equation: 
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International bilateral trade data, in British pound sterling, are from the TRADHIST 
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both directly from primary sources and from other well-known historical trade 
databases such as RICardo (Dedinger and Gerard, 2017).7 Data on domestic trade flows 
are not readily available. Theory consistent estimates of domestic trade data rely on 
                                                          
7 TRADHIST provides information on the original source of each trade flow reported in the database.  
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input-output tables or gross production.8 However, information available for the first 
globalization period is very limited, at best. I therefore follow Yotov (2012) and El-
Dahrawy and Timini (2021), and calculate domestic trade flows (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, ∀ i=j) as the 
difference between nominal GDP and total nominal exports, both directly available from 
the same source used for bilateral trade flows, i.e. the TRADHIST database. The 
theoretical limit ions of this approach are th roughly described in Head and Mayer
(2014). However, C mpos et al. (2021) recen ly show mpirically that the estimations of
the impact of t ade policy on trade and welfare are very robust to different ways of
c lcul ting dome tic tra e.9 
Information on tr de agreements ha  been retrieved fro  the T Agreements
Database (Pahre, 2007). In line with other studies on the Cobden-Chevalier network, the 
period of analysis is 1855-1875.10 Bilateral distance, which is used in robustness checks, 
is taken from CEPII. The sample includes 24 countries (sample selection is based on the 
availability of sufficient data for domestic trade calculations). 
  
                                                          
8 Input-output tables allow to construct domestic trade by exploiting information on intermediate and 
final consumption (see Timmer, 2015, for more information, and Larch et al., 2018, for an application). 
Gross output data allows to estimate domestic trade as “apparent consumption”, by substracting gross 
exports from gross production (see Dai et al., 2014, or Borchert and Yotov, 2017, for an application). 
9 I also recall that, due to the set of fixed effects included in the regressions (i.e. exporter-time, importer-
time, and directional pair fixed effects), estimates are influenced by the change of domestic trade relative 
to international trade, and not by their levels. 
10 This choice is motivated by three intertwined reasons. First, by a historical reason: the economic 
conditions surrounding the Cobden-Chevalier trade network drastically changed by the end of the 1870s 
– beginning of the 1880s, with the return of protectionist policies. The increasing protectionism drastically 
changed the existing trade treaties and the MFN clauses contained therein. In some cases, bilateral trade 
treaties were repealed, in some others they were modified (including less favorable preferential 
treatments). Therefore, historically, the Cobden-Chevalier trade network coincided with the period under 
analysis. Second, by an empirical reason: the substantial and frequent bilateral trade policy changes (i.e. 
repeal, or change in preferential treatments contained in the trade agreements) make the estimation of 
the “trade agreement effect” more complicated. Third reason is related to comparability purposes, as the 
studies on the Cobden-Chevalier trade effects focused on this period.  
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4. R sults and discussion 
The main result , base  on the structural gravity model described in the previous 
sections, are present d in Tabl  1. 
Table 1: Effects of the Cobden-Chevalier network – Structural gravity estimates 















TA 0.0125 0.270*** 0.241*** 
  (0.054) (0.060) (0.041) 
       
Observations 5,232 5,638 5,638 
Domestic trad  NO YES YES 
I t .bord*year NO NO YES 
Exp.-time & 
imp.time FEs YES YES YES 
Dir. pair FEs YES YES YES 
Note: PPML regressions. Fixed effects, control variables and constants not reported for the 
sake of simplicity. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the exporter, importer and 
time level. 
 ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
In Column 1, I replicate the approa h of Accominotti an  Flandreau (2008) and Lampe 
(2009) by using international trade data only. In line with their contributions, I find that 
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regressions is of crucial importance for the understanding of the “true” effect of the 
Cobden-Chevalier network: the inclusion of domestic trade captures the trade diversion 
effect from do estic to international trade (Dai et al., 2014). 
F gure 3 compl s the i form tion rep rted in Tab e 1 (that focuses on trade
agreements), by plotting 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡, the coeffici nts (and correspondent confidence intervals) 
of the variable  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, i.e. the interaction between the international border 
dummy and year dummies. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1875 is omitted given the inclusion of a 
constant.12 The evolution of these coefficients, as portrayed in Figure 3, can be 
interpreted as a “globalization trend”. The value estimated for 𝜌𝜌1855, -0.391, denotes 
that “thicker” international borders in 1855 were reducing international relative to 
domestic trade by 32% with respect to 1875 conditions (i.e. 100*[𝑒𝑒−0.391 − 1]). The 
declining 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 coefficients match well with the historical account of a widespread 
reduction in trade costs, e.g. falling transport costs due to the expansion of railroads and 
steamships (Jacks et al., 2010; Pascali, 2017). 
Figure 3: The declining effect of international borders, 1855-1875. 
 
                                                          
12 As explained in Bergstrand et al. (2015), given the set of fixed effects included in the structural gravity 
model, it is not possible to interpret the constant as the estimated of the omitted international border-
year variable. The initial level of the international border effect is captured by the pair fixed effects, and 
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The estimations presented in Table 1 are robust to a series of alternative specifications, 
reported in Table 2, where I disentangle potential confounding factors to reduce 
concerns for possible omitted variable bias. 
In Column 1, I follow Bergstrand et al. (2015), and add to my main specification (equation 
(6)) a time-varying distance effects (the logarithm of bilateral distance interacted with 
year dummies), a stricter way of controlling for other sources of (bilateral) integration. 
In Column 2, I control for fixed exchange rate arrangements, such as the Gold Standard 
and the Latin Monetary Union (LMU), by inserting a dummy equal to one in case both 
the exporter and the importer are part of the arrangement. In both cases the coefficient 
is not statistically different from zero. The LMU results confirm its insignificant “average 
effect” on trade (Flandr au, 2000; Timini, 2018). Th  Gold Standard results re to be 
r ated with caution as I only capture its very early years in the sample and the dummy 
has very limited variation (very few entries and exits). Indeed, Accominotti and 
Flandreau (2008) and Lampe (2009) do not consider the gold standard in their 
regressions. In Column 3, to address the Cheng and Wall (2005) concerns of a possibly 
sluggish response of trade to trade agreements, I follow Baier and Bergstrand (2007) 
approach and use 5-year intervals. Column 4 and Column 5 provide a test for strict 
exogeneity by including leads of the trade agreement dummy (Baier and Bergstrand, 
2007; Kohl, 2014; Yotov et al., 2016). The small and not statistically significant 
coefficients of the leads (together with the positive and significant coefficient of the 
contemporaneous trade agreement dummy) suggest the absence of reverse causality. 
The higher point estimate of the lead in Column 4 (with respect to Column 5) may be 
explained by the presence of some anticipation effects in the very short run (Yotov et 
al., 2016). In Column 6, I separately consider aggregate tariffs (different from bilateral 
tariffs, captured by the trade agreement dummy). The TRADHIST database contains a 
measure of “customs duties-to-imports” ratio, at the country level. Despite being only a 
crude proxy of tariffs (Tena-Junguito et al., 2013), it has been widely used in the 
historical literature, particularly in the absence of valid alternatives (e.g. Accominotti 
and Flandreau, 2008). Apart from disentangling multilateral tariff reductions, the tariff 
coefficient can be expressed in terms of trade elasticity of substitution 
𝜎𝜎=−𝛽𝛽(ln(1+tariff)). The value of 𝜎𝜎 (4.6) that can be extracted from the regression in 
Column (6) lies within the “likely range” (2.5<𝜎𝜎<5.1) indicated by Bajzik et al. (2020) as 
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a result of a meta-analysis of the literature, and is very close to Simonovska and Waugh 
(2014) estimation results (𝜎𝜎 = 4). 
To summarize, my main results of a large, positive, and significant Cobden-Chevalier 
network trade effect do not change across specifications. 
 

























TA 0.196*** 0.253*** 0.332*** 0.180*** 0.333*** 0.130*** 
  (0.058) (0.041) (0.075) (0.062) (0.072) (0.046) 
GS  -0.115     
  (0.092)     
LMU  -0.005     
  (0.072)     
TA_Lead    0.079 -0.006  
    (0.068) (0.083)  
ln(1+tariff)      -4.625*** 
      (0.703) 
       
Observations 5,638 5,638 1,391 5,638 1,391 2,186 
Dir. pair FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Exp.-time & 
imp.time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Intl.bord*year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
ln(dist)*year YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Year intervals NO NO YES (5-year) NO YES (5-year) NO 
Note: PPML regressions. Fixed effects, additional control variables and constants not reported for the sake of 
simplicity. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the exporter, importer and time level. 
 ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
Figure 4 displays agreement level estimates derived from a structural gravity model 
(equation (7)) for 37 different trade agreements. Out of these 37 estimated coefficients, 
14 (38%) are positive and significant, 18 (49%) are not statistically significant, and only 
4 (13%) are negative and significant. The distribution of the treaty-level coefficient is 
very heterogeneous. Such heterogeneity across trade agreements is similar to what 
have already been documented for the second globalization wave (Kohl et al., 2016; 
Baier et al., 2018; Baier et al., 2019; Freeman and Pienknagura, 2019). 
I note that the point estimates corresponding to the treaties used as examples of 
“important reductions” in Section 2, i.e. the 1860 Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce 
(FRA-GBR in Figure 4), the treaty between Italy and Austria-Hungary (AUT-ITA), and 
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Figure 4 displays agreement level estimates derived from a structural gravity model 
(equation (7)) for 37 different trade agreements. Out of these 37 estimated coefficients, 
14 (38%) are positive and significant, 18 (49%) are not statistically significant, and only 
4 (13%) are negative and significant. The distribution of the treaty-level coefficient is 
very heterogeneous. Such heterogeneity across trade agreements is similar to what 
have already been documented for the second globalization wave (Kohl et al., 2016; 
Baier et al., 2018; Baier et al., 2019; Freeman and Pienknagura, 2019). 
I note that the point estimates corresponding to the treaties used as examples of 
“important reductions” in Section 2, i.e. the 1860 Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce 
(FRA-GBR in Figure 4), the treaty between Italy and Austria-Hungary (AUT-ITA), and 
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between Italy and France (FRA-ITA), are all positive, and for the two former cases also 
very large. Indeed, point estimates suggest that the 1860 Anglo-French Treaty of 
Commerce increased trade by 64% (100*[𝑒𝑒0.494 − 1]), more than twice the average 
effect. The treaty between Italy and Austria-Hungary increased trade by 53%  
(100*[𝑒𝑒0.423 − 1]). In the case of the treaty between Italy and France, the estimation 
procedure rely on very few pre-treatment observations, however the point estimate 
indicates a 8% increase in bilateral trade (100*[𝑒𝑒0.087 − 1]). 
However, treaty-level estimations should be interpreted with the caveats mentioned in 
Baier et al. (2019): the more granular are the estimates, the fewer data points to rely 
on, the wider the confidence bands of the coefficient, the higher the likelihood of 
incurring in an omitted variable bias or reverse causality. These issues may be 
exacerbated by the unbalanced nature of the database, i.e. by missing data points or 
short pre-treatment periods. 
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5. General equilibrium 
Exploiting the partial equilibrium estimates (reported in Section 4), I compute the 
general equilibrium trade and welfare effects of the Cobden-Chevalier network. 
To do so, it is necessary to complement and expand the system of gravity equations 
presented in Section 2 (eq. (1)-(3)). Indeed, within this theoretical context,13 by 
assuming labor as the only factor of production, and imposing a market clearing 




This means that to obtain the gains from trade (?̂?𝐺), the necessary inputs are only two 
(“sufficient statistics”). First, ?̂?𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , the change in the exporter’s i domestic trade share 
(before and after the “shock”, i.e. in this case the change in bilateral trade costs deriving 
from the entry into force of a trade agreement). Second, a measure of trade elasticity. 
In this context, the changes in exports, imports and welfare15 (as reported in Table 3) 
                                                          
13 I implement a one sector constant elasticity of substitution (CES) trade model, which corresponds to a 
fairly standard version of general equilibrium structural gravity. This version of the model is very 
transparent and it fits the purpose of, and it is well equipped for, performing “benchmark trade and 
welfare estimates” of the Cobden Chevalier network. The model does not consider, however, other 
factors such as input-output linkages, dynamic effects, trade in intermediates, etc., whose inclusion in the 
model is usually considered as welfare-augmenting. The model also does not allow for tariff revenue 
effects related to the elimination of tariffs following the implementation of a trade treaties. These effects 
however are composed by two effects with opposite sign: a tariff revenue loss, corresponding to a transfer 
from the State to consumers, and a tariff revenue gain, derived from the enlargement of the tax base. The 
sign of the overall effect is therefore uncertain, and possibly even more so in a 19th century context, where 
tariff revenues constituted an important part of the revenues of the state, but the extent of its 
transformation to transfers to consumers is subject of debate, given the state expenditure structure. I 
therefore prefer to keep it equal to zero, in line with the extant literature (e.g. Baier et al., 2019). This 
model, with the same features, has been applied to estimate general equilibrium trade and welfare effects 
of trade agreements during the second globalization wave, and of the GATT/WTO (see, e.g., Baier et al., 
2019; Felbermayr et al., 2020), and, generally, it is widely accepted as an appropriate benchmark for 
computing general equilibrium effects of trade policies. 
14 In their handbook chapter, Head and Mayer (2014) report the step-by-step procedure to calculate 
partial and general equilibrium trade and welfare effects caused by a change in bilateral trade frictions. 
See in particular, equations (32) to (36), and the explanation thereafter. Yotov et al. (2016) and Campos 
and Timini (2021) also provide thorough discussions of the specifics of general equilibrium gravity models. 
I thus refer to those publications for further details because, as demonstrated by Arkolakis et al. (2012), 
these are irrelevant for the final results. 
15 As explained in Yotov et al. (2016), in this class of models the term welfare can be interpreted as real 
GDP. Arkolakis et al. (2012), as explained in Campos and Timini (2021), show that “welfare” is 
interpretable as the consumption of a representative agent.  
16 
 
5. General quilibrium 
Exploiting the partial equilibrium estimates (reported in Section 4), I compute the 
general equilibrium trade and welfare effects of the Cobden-Chevalier network. 
To do so, it is necessary to complement and expand the system of gravity equations 
presented in Section 2 (eq. (1)-(3)). Indeed, within this theoretical context,13 by 
assuming labor as the only factor of production, and imposing a market clearing 




This means that to obtain the gains from trade (?̂?𝐺), the necessary inputs are only two 
(“sufficient statistics”). First, ?̂?𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , the change in the exporter’s i domestic trade share 
(before and after the “shock”, i.e. in this case the change in bilateral trade costs deriving 
from the entry into force of a trade agreement). Second, a measure of trade elasticity. 
In this context, the changes in exports, imports and welfare15 (as reported in Table 3) 
                                                          
13 I implement a one sector constant elasticity of substitution (CES) trade model, which corresponds to a 
fairly standard version of general equilibrium structural gravity. This version of the model is very 
transparent and it fits the purpose of, and it is well equipped for, performing “benchmark trade and 
welfare estimates” of the Cobden Chevalier network. The model does not consider, however, other 
factors such as input-output linkages, dynamic effects, trade in intermediates, etc., whose inclusion in the 
model is usually considered as welfare-augmenting. The model also does not allow for tariff revenue 
effects related to the eli ination of tariffs following the implementation of a trade treaties. These effects 
however are composed by two effects with opposite sign: a tariff revenue loss, corresponding to a transfer 
from the State to consumers, and a tariff revenue gain, derived from the enlargement of the tax base. The 
sign of the overall effect is therefore uncertain, and possibly even more so in a 19th century context, where 
tariff revenues constituted an important part of the revenues of the state, but the extent of its 
transformation to transfers to consumers is subject of debate, given the state expenditure structure. I 
therefore prefer to keep it equal to zero, in line with the extant literature (e.g. Baier et al., 2019). This 
model, with the same features, has been applied to estimate general equilibrium trade and welfare effects 
of trade agreements during the second globalization wave, and of the GATT/WTO (see, e.g., Baier et al., 
2019; Felbermayr et al., 2020), and, generally, it is widely accepted as an appropriate benchmark for 
computing general equilibriu  effects of trade policies. 
14 In their handbook chapter, Head and Mayer (2014) report the step-by-step procedure to calculate 
partial and general equilibrium trade and welfare effects caused by a change in bilateral trade frictions. 
See in particular, equations (32) to (36), and the explanation thereafter. Yotov et al. (2016) and Campos 
and Timini (2021) also provide thorough discussions of the specifics of general equilibrium gravity models. 
I thus refer to those publications for further details because, as demonstrated by Arkolakis et al. (2012), 
these are irrelevant for the final results. 
15 As explained in Yotov et al. (2016), in this class of models the term welfare can be interpreted as real 
GDP. Arkolakis et al. (2012), as explained in Campos and Timini (2021), show that “welfare” is 
interpretable as the consumption of a representative agent.  
17 
 
should be interpreted as medium-to-long-term static effects,16 and are the result of the 
difference between the values those variables take in a “baseline” and in a 
“counterfactual” scenario. In this case, these two situations correspond to a situation 
thout and with the Cobden-Cheval er trade network. 
Thus, using this model, I am able to estimate how the Cobden-Chevalier network
influenced total exports, total imports, and the welfare of nations during the 1860s-
1870s. To do so, I insert in the general equilibrium model a “shock” correspondent to 
the reduction in bilateral trade costs attributable to the Cobden-Chevalier network. That 
is to say, th  “TA” coefficient (𝛽𝛽1) estimated in equation 6 (i.e. 𝛽𝛽TA≈0.241), my preferred
specific tion.17 This shock affects bil teral trad  flows and the other variables of the
model (e.g. production, expenditure, multilateral resistances, wages).18  
To perform the general equilibrium analysis, I need a balanced dataset, and to assume 
zero effect of our treatment at the reference year of choice. Therefore, to avoid missing 
data and to have rea onable level of bilater l trad , I averaged trade flows for all
directional country pairs in the database during the p riod 1855-1870. For the existence
of a trade agreement between the country pair, I took 1870 as the reference year. The 
trade elasticity parameter is set at 𝜎𝜎=4, as estimated by Simonovska and Waugh (2014), 
and very close to the median value indicated by Bajzik et al. (2020) in their meta-analysis. 
Table 3 display the results of the general equilibrium analysis. Overall, general 
equilibrium trade and welfare effects of the Cobden-Chevalier network are large. On 
average, the Cobden-Chevalier network increased total exports by 9.6%, total imports 
by 9.9%, and welfare by 0.3%. However, here too, there is a substantial degree of 
heterogeneity. Trade gains of large European countries, that signed a large number of 
trade agreements, are well above average. For example, Great Britain increases exports 
                                                          
16 Given a variety of reasons analyzed in the literature (e.g. phase-in periods, economic adjustments, 
structural transformations, etc.), trade agreements do not achieve their “full potential” instantaneously. 
Bergstrand et al. (2015) suggest the full potential is achieved only after 8-12 years since the entry into 
force of the treaty. 
17 Given the concerns expressed while discussing granular estimates (i.e. wider confidence bands for the 
coefficients and higher risks of omitted variable bias or endogeneity), I prefer to use the “average effect” 
for capturing general equilibrium. While using granular estimates will augment the heterogeneity of 
general equilibrium effects, it is comforting to see that the model is able to capture and report 
heterogeneity even with a “average” reduction in bilateral trade costs, mirroring the different exposure 
of each country to the network (both in terms of agreements signed and share of trade involved).  
18 In this context, the model provides a general equilibrium solution to an endowment economy, and 
correspond to a “general equilibrium” model (as opposed to “modular”) in Head and Mayer (2014) 
classification, as “wages (and therefore GDPs) also adjust to trade costs” (p.166). 
17 
 
should be interpreted as medium-to-long-term static effects,16 and are the result of the 
difference between the values those variables take in a “baseline” and in a 
“counterfactual” scenario. In this case, these two situations correspond to a situation 
without and with the Cobden-Chevalier trade network. 
Thus, using this model, I am able to estimate how the Cobden-Chevalier network 
influenced total exports, total imports, and the welfare of nations during the 1860s-
1870s. To do so, I insert in the general equilibrium model a “shock” correspondent to 
the reduction in bilateral trade costs attributable to the Cobden-Chevalier network. That 
is to say, the “TA” coefficient (𝛽𝛽1) estimated in equation 6 (i.e. 𝛽𝛽TA≈0.241), my preferred 
specification.17 This shock affects bilateral trade flows and the other variables of the 
model (e.g. production, expenditure, multilateral resistances, wages).18  
To perform the general equilibrium analysis, I need a balanced dataset, and to assume 
zero effect of our treatment at the reference year of choice. Therefore, to avoid missing 
dat  and to have reasonable le e  of bilateral trade, I averaged trade flows for all
directional country pairs in the da abase during the period 1855-1870. F r the existence
of a trade agreement between the country pair, I took 1870 as the reference year. The 
trade elasticity parameter is set at 𝜎𝜎=4, as estimated by Simonovska and Waugh (2014), 
and very close to the median value indicated by Bajzik et al. (2020) in their meta-analysis. 
Table 3 display the r s lts of the g neral equilibr um analysis. Overall, general
equilibrium tr d  and welfare ef ects of th  Cobden-Chevalier network are large. On 
average, the Cobden-Chevalier net ork increased total exports by 9.6%, total imports 
by 9.9%, and welfare by 0.3%. However, here too, there is a substantial degree of 
heterogeneity. Trade gains of large European countries, that signed a large number of 
trade agreements, are well above average. For example, Great Britain increases exports
                                                       
16 Given a variety of reasons analyzed in the literature (e.g. phase-in periods, economic adjustments, 
structural transformations, etc.), trade agreements do not achieve their “full potential” instantaneously. 
Bergstrand et al. (2015) suggest the full potential is achieved only after 8-12 years since the entry into 
force of the treaty. 
17 Given the concerns expressed while discussing granular estimates (i.e. wider confidence bands for the 
coefficients and higher risks of omitted variable bias or endogeneity), I prefer to use the “average effect” 
for capturing general equilibrium. While using granular estimates will augm nt the het rogen ity of
general equilibrium effects, it is comforting to see that the model is able to capture and report 
heterogeneity even with a “average” reduction in bilateral trade costs, mirroring the different exposure 
of each country to the network (both in terms of agreements signed and share of trade involved).  
18 In this context, the model provides a general equilibrium solution to an endowment economy, and 
correspond to a “general equilibrium” model (as opposed to “modular”) in Head and Mayer (2014) 
classification, as “wages (and therefore GDPs) also adjust to trade costs” (p.166). 
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nd imports by 16 and 13% resp ctively; Franc  by 22 and 24%, Italy by 28 and 19%.
Consequently, their welfare gains ar  also above average. In terms of welfare gains,
owever, small open economies are th se that benefited the most, given the reduced
ize of heir domestic (rel ti  to international) trad . The g neral equilibri m
calculatio s also indicate that the Cobden-Chevalier network had some trade diversion 
eff cts that, d spite exce ding trade creation effects in certain cases (mostly for non-
members; the negative numbers for exports, imports, and welfare in Table 3), were very 
limited in size. 
 
T ble 3: Cobde -Chevalier trad  network gen ral equilibriu  effec s. 
COUNTRY ∆% EXPORTS ∆% IMPORTS ∆% WELFARE
AUS -1.32 -1.06 -0.05
AUT 19.41 27.77 0.14
BEL 16.91 18.61 0.80
BRA -0.08 -0.09 -0.01
CAN 8.65 10.75 0.34
CHL 19.23 21.09 0.61
CHN -0.75 -1.67 0.00
COL 23.39 24.36 0.76
DEU 19.38 19.48 0.46
DNK -0.73 -0.76 -0.04
ESP 10.84 7.47 0.13
FIN -1.14 -0.74 -0.01
FRA 22.50 23.92 0.49
GBR 15.85 13.08 0.74
GRC -1.41 -1.44 -0.08
ITA 27.55 18.70 0.46
JPN -0.91 -1.24 0.00
NLD 7.00 8.15 0.97
NOR 3.28 3.53 0.16
NZL -0.83 -0.51 -0.01
PRT 18.36 14.96 0.22
SWE 1.41 1.71 0.05
URY 6.99 8.59 0.81
USA 17.99 24.10 0.26
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This paper exploits econometric methods at the frontier of the empirical trade literature 
to reassess the trade effects of the “free trade epidemic” during the 1860s and 1870s. 
Additionally, it also provides the correspondent general equilibrium trade and welfare 
effects. 
Using a PPML estimation strategy (Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) and crucially 
including domestic trade flows, I find that the trade agreements included in my sample 
have, on average, a large, positive, and significant effect (+27%) on members’ bilateral 
trade. Treaty-level estimates reveal a considerable degree of heterogeneity across trade 
agreements. For example, the famous Anglo-French treaty of 1860, the Cobden-
Chevalier network milestone, had an effect more than two times larger than the average 
(+64%). 
The quantification of trade and welfare general equilibrium effects show important 
insights. The Cobden-Chevalier network notably affected total trade and the welfare of 
nations, by increasing total exports by 9.6%, total imports by 9.9%, and welfare by 0.3% 
on average. There is a substantial degree of heterogeneity here too. Countries with a 
considerable number of trade agreements (such as Great Britain, France, or Italy) 
perform 1.5 to 3 times as well as the average effect. Small open economies tend to 
report larger welfare gains. The general equilibrium calculations also indicate that the 
trade diversion effects of the Cobden-Chevalier network were very limited.  
These results reshape the understanding of the trade and welfare effects of the Cobden-
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dom. trade & 
“globalization” 
 (3) 
TA 0.0130 0.276*** 0.244***    
  (0.0566) (0.0589) (0.0434)    
TA_Lazer    -0.0641 0.382*** 0.249*** 
    (0.0589) (0.0187) (0.0881) 
          
Observations 5,078 5,408 5,408 5,078 5,408 5,408 
Domestic trade NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Globalization NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Exp.-time & 
imp.time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dir. pair FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 


































dom. trade & 
“globalization” 
 (3) 
TA -0.0274 0.304*** 0.292*** -0.000997 0.288*** 0.254*** 
  (0.0851) (0.0787) (0.0558) (0.0625) (0.0573) (0.0425) 
          
Observations 783 915 915 3,063 3,315 3,315 
Domestic trade NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Globalization NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Exp.-time & 
imp.time FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dir. pair FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 

















dom. trade & 
“globalization” 
 (3) 
TA 0.00623 0.274*** 0.242*** 
  (0.0579) (0.0582) (0.0442) 
       
Observations 6,519 6,877 6,877 
Domestic trade NO YES YES 
Globalization NO NO YES 
Exp.-time & 
imp.time FEs YES YES YES 
Dir. pair FEs YES YES YES 
Note: PPML regressions. A&F: Accominotti and Flandreau (2008). L_”core” and L_”extended”: Lampe (2009). LC&M: Lopez-Cordova 
and Meissner (2003). “TA_Lazer” definition reported in footnote 12. Fixed effects, control variables and constants not reported for 
the sake of simplicity. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the exporter, importer and time level.  
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
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